Standards of Medical Care for General Practitioners in Montana: The Chapel Decision and a Move Toward a National Standard by McGrath, Swithin S.
Montana Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 1 Winter 1992 Article 6
January 1992
Standards of Medical Care for General
Practitioners in Montana: The Chapel Decision
and a Move Toward a National Standard
Swithin S. McGrath
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Swithin S. McGrath, Standards of Medical Care for General Practitioners in Montana: The Chapel Decision and a Move Toward a National
Standard, 53 Mont. L. Rev. (1992).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/6
STANDARDS OF MEDICAL CARE FOR GENERAL
PRACTITIONERS IN MONTANA: THE CHAPEL
DECISION AND A MOVE TOWARD A NATIONAL
STANDARD
Swithin S. McGrath
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1950s specialists in the medical profession have
increasingly replaced family doctors.' This trend has added to the
medical malpractice epidemic of the last century.2 In addressing
the medical malpractice crisis over the years, the courts have re-
vised and redefined the standards of medical care that tradition-
ally have governed physicians nationwide. As new laws are created,
the courts continually strive to "protect the faithful and conscien-
tious practitioner from any loss by reason of matters for which it
would be unreasonable to hold him responsible, and at the same
time to guard the public against the practice of incompetent per-
sons who hold themselves out as physicians."3
In 1990, the Montana Supreme Court in Chapel v. Allison4
addressed the standard of medical care applicable to non-board-
certified general practitioners practicing in Montana.' This leading
case brings Montana law into line with a developing trend of im-
posing a national standard of medical care for all general practi-
tioners.' The supreme court's decision overturned the "same or
1. Note, Civil Liability of Physicians and Surgeons For Malpractice, 35 MINN. L. REV.
186, 186-87 (1951).
2. Id.
3. Note, The Standard of Skill and Care Governing the Civil Liability of Physicians,
78 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 100 (1929).
4. 241 Mont. 83, 785 P.2d 204 (1990).
5. Id. at 89, 785 P.2d at 207. This note will refer to non-board-certified general practi-
tioners simply as "general practitioners."
6. Amicus Brief of the Montana Medical Association at 19, Chapel v. Allison, 241
Mont. 83, 785 P.2d 204 (1990) (No. 88-550) [hereinafter Amicus Brief-MMA]. Because any
final judgment on the standards of medical care in Montana undoubtedly would have a
substantial impact on the medical community and its patients, the supreme court invited
and reviewed amicus briefs from the Montana Trial Lawyers' Association [hereinafter
MTLA], the Montana Hospital Association [hereinafter MHA], and the Montana Medical
Association [hereinafter MMAJ.
The MTLA argued for adoption of the national standard of care: "a physician is under
a duty to use that degree of skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner
in the same class to which it belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances." Chapel,
241 Mont. at 90, 785 P.2d at 208. MTLA argued that all physicians generally receive the
same standardized education and have access to modern medical technology and informa-
tion. Id. MTLA also advocated the "same or similar circumstances" clause to account for
local factors and conditions. Id. 1
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similar locality" rule, recognized in Tallbull v. Whitney,7 as the
governing standard, and applied a new national standard of medi-
cal care for general practitioners.8
The discussion that follows focuses on the Montana Supreme
Court's holding in Chapel v. Allison. The note first traces the gen-
eral developments of the standard of medical care for physicians in
the United States and the historical development of the standards
of medical care for physicians in Montana. Second, the note will
discuss the court's reasoning and unanimous decision to expand
the locality rule beyond Montana's borders and overrule Tallbull.
Third, the note analyzes the competing standards of medical care
proposed by the litigants and the implications of adopting a new
standard. Finally, the note considers the effects of the decision on
the standards of medical care for general practitioners in Montana.
II. STANDARDS OF MEDICAL CARE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The earliest principles governing the standards of medical
conduct required that a doctor "exercise a reasonable degree of
skill and care ... usually exercised by ordinarily skillful and care-
ful members of the medical profession."9 This broad standard
worked well until the courts found that city doctors generally dis-
played greater expertise and skill than did their rural col-
leagues-"the country doctors."' 0 Because the urban areas pro-
vided more lucrative employment opportunities, they tended to
attract the "more talented of the profession."" Likewise, greater
access to facilities and resources enabled city doctors to develop
The MHA argued that the application of the "same locality" rule should continue be-
cause rural hospitals face the threat of closure due to a lack of use and money. Id. at 91, 785
P.2d at 209. They argued the "rule is needed to keep physicians [in rural areas] providing
essential health services and utilizing local rural hospitals." Id.
Because the court relied substantially on the arguments posed by the various amicus
parties in reaching the Chapel decision, this note will make numerous references to the
amicus briefs.
7. 172 Mont. 326, 564 P.2d 162 (1977).
8. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 92, 785 P.2d at 210. Tallbull held that a licensed general
practitioner would be held to the standard of care of a licensed general practitioner practic-
ing in the "same or similar community in Montana." 172 Mont. at 335, 564 P.2d at 166.
Prior to Tallbull the "strict locality" rule limited the standard of medical care to the same
community in which the physician lived. Id. at 331, 564 P.2d at 164.
9. Note, Problems of Negligent Malpractice, 26 VA. L. REV. 919, 920 (1940).
10. Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497, 501 (1877). See generally, Notes: The Standard of
Skill and Care Governing the Civil Liability of Physicians, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1929);
Problems of Negligent Malpractice, 26 VA. L. REV. 919 (1940); Civil Liability of Physicians
and Surgeons for Malpractice, 35 MINN L. REV. 186 (1951); Degree of Care and Skill Re-
quired of Physicians and Surgeons in Iowa, 36 IOWA L. REV. 681 (1951).
11. Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 25, 69 S.W. 1096, 1097 (1902).
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superior professional skills and knowledge than rural doctors."
The courts found that holding country doctors to the same
standard of skill and care of city doctors had two unfortunate ef-
fects.' 3 The country doctors either left the rural areas and moved
into the city, where they too could have access to resources for pro-
fessional development, or they left the medical profession alto-
gether.14 This result left many rural communities without adequate
medical care and services.1 5
Only in the late nineteenth century, when the courts began to
take judicial notice of the "varying degrees of competency" among
doctors, did the general standard change to reflect the changing
needs of society.' 6 In response to the exodus of rural doctors from
the countryside, state courts began to attach territorial limita-
tions-"locality" rules-to the general rule of liability.'"
In 1920, the Montana Supreme Court joined this national
trend when it adopted the "strict locality" rule. 8 The strict local-
ity rule requires that a physician's conduct be judged by the stan-
dards of reasonable and ordinary skill, care and expertise of physi-
cians "of good standing of the same system or school of practice in
the community in which [the physician] resides."' 9 The expert wit-
ness who testifies under this rule is expected to know those meth-
ods, procedures, and treatments prevailing in that community at
the time. 0
Although arguably practical, especially for a rural state like
Montana, the rule received increasing public criticism because of a
presumption that it tended to "immunize physicians" from their
negligent conduct." Specifically, two compelling arguments ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the strict locality rule and ultimately led
to relaxation of the rule's application.2
First, if a community had only two physicians and they were
12. Note, Problems of Negligent Malpractice, 26 VA. L. REV. 919, 920 (1940).
13. Note, The Standard of Skill and Care Governing the Civil Liability of Physicians,
78 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 96-97 (1929).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Pearson v. Crabtree, 70 Cal. App. 52, 232 P. 715 (1924).
18. Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 58-59, 187 P. 282, 284 (1920). The strict locality rule
has been characterized as the "same community" or "same locality" rule.
19. Hansen, 57 Mont. at 59, 187 P. at 285, quoted in Chapel, 241 Mont. at 87, 785
P.2d at 206.
20. Amicus Brief-MMA, supra note 6, at 8.
21. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Montana Trial Lawyers' Association at 9, Chapel v.
Allison, 241 Mont. 83, 785 P.2d 204 (1990)(No. 88-550)[hereinafter Amicus Brief-MTLA].
22. Id.
1992]
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both incompetent, setting an inferior standard for that town, the
courts as a matter of policy could not condone these customary
standards. 23 In so doing, the courts in effect were allowing physi-
cians to escape liability.24 Second, because of the well-known "con-
spiracy of silence" amongst doctors not to testify against one an-
other, the boundary limitations made it difficult if not impossible
for a patient to obtain expert medical testimony.2 5 As a response to
these policy concerns, the Montana Supreme Court's 1977 Ta~lbull
decision abrogated the "strict locality" rule and adopted the "same
or similar locality" rule.2" By the time Montana adopted this ex-
panded locality rule, the national trend had moved away from "lo-
cality" standards altogether.2 Coming almost full circle, many
states, including Montana after Chapel, have since returned to a
national standard of care (without geographical boundaries) which
essentially requires a general practitioner "to use that degree of
care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practi-
tioner in the same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or
similar circumstances.
2
Other Montana decisions revised the standards of medical
care for a board-certified orthopedic specialist and a board-certi-
fied family practitioner.2 9 In 1985, the Montana Supreme Court in
Aasheim v. Humberger ° modified the Tallbull rule with respect to
orthopedic surgeons."1 The court found that if the defendant in a
medical malpractice action was a board-certified specialist, his or
her skill and learning "would be measured by the skill and learning
possessed by other doctors in good standing, practicing in the same
specialty and who hold the same national board certification. 32
The court stated that all board-certified specialists, by virtue of
their national certification, possess the same credible standard of
skill, training and expertise. 3 Therefore, it made sense to hold
them to a national standard.34
Similarly, in 1988 in Glover v. Ballhagen,35 the court ad-
23. Tallbull v. Whitney, 172 Mont. 326, 333, 564, P.2d 162, 165-66 (1977).
24. Id. at 333-34, 564 P.2d at 166.
25. Id. at 334, 564 P.2d at 166.
26. Id. at 335, 564 P.2d at 166.
27. Anicus Brief-MTLA, supra note 21, at 9.
28. Id. at 11.
29. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 88, 785 P.2d at 207.
30. 215 Mont. 127, 695 P.2d 824 (1985).
31. Aasheim at 131, 695 P.2d at 827.
32. Id. at 130, 695 P.2d at 826.
33. Id. at 131, 695 P.2d at 827.
34. Id.
35. 232 Mont. 427, 756 P.2d 1166 (1988).
[Vol. 53
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dressed standards of medical care for board-certified specialists,
specifically board-certified family practitioners.16 Following the
same reasoning as in Aasheim, the court found that a board-certi-
fied family practitioner would be held to "that skill and learning
possessed by other doctors in good standing practicing with the
same national board certification."37 Both cases provide an impor-
tant, well reasoned transition from the localized standards which
have historically characterized rural states like Montana, and ad-
just the standards to a developing national standard.
III. THE Chapel DECISION
A. Factual History
Chapel suffered a severe leg injury while breaking a filly on
February 18, 1983.38 His son took him to the emergency room at
Livingston Memorial Hospital where Chapel came under the im-
mediate care and treatment of Dr. James G. Allison (Allison), his
physician of nearly 20 years.3 ' From the x-rays, Allison diagnosed
the fracture as a "comminuted undisplaced fracture of the ... left
tibia," and applied a long leg cast covering Chapel's left leg and
foot. °
Soon after his release from the hospital on February 21, 1983,
Chapel complained of pain at the fracture spot on his left leg."' He
mentioned to Allison that the cast appeared "crooked in that it
angled his left leg below the knee inward to a 'bow-legged' posi-
tion."42 On May 2, 1983, Chapel's cast was removed." Chapel's leg
displayed a "bow-leggedness" that required corrective surgery."
On September 19, 1984 at St. Vincent's Hospital in Billings, Mon-
tana, Dr. Richard Snider performed the surgery, removing a piece
of broken bone from Chapel's leg. 5
B. Procedural History
After surgery, Chapel brought a medical malpractice action
36. Id. at 429, 756 P.2d at 1168.
37. Id. at 430, 756 P.2d at 1168.
38. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at 2, Chapel v. Allison, 241 Mont. 83, 785 P.2d 204
(1990)(No. 88-550)[hereinafter Brief-Appellant].
39. Brief for Respondent at 4, Chapel v. Allison, 241 Mont. 83, 785 P.2d 204
(1990)(No. 88-550)[hereinafter Brief-Respondent].
40. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 84, 785 P.2d at 204.
41. Brief-Appellant, supra note 38, at 5.
42. Id.
43. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 84, 785 P.2d at 205.
44. Id.
45. Id.
1992]
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against Allison to recover damages for the negligent care and treat-
ment of Chapel's orthopedic injury.4" After plaintiff's case in chief,
Allison moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability."7 The
district court granted the motion on the grounds that Chapel failed
to offer sufficient evidence to prove that Allison did not meet the
standard of care he owed to Chapel.48 Thereafter, Chapel appealed
the directed verdict ruling.4 9
C. The Holding: Broadening Montana's Boundaries
In Chapel, the Montana Supreme Court overturned the
Tallbull rule and held that "a non-board-certified general practi-
tioner is held to the standard of care of a 'reasonably competent
general practitioner acting in the same or similar community in the
United States in the same or similar circumstances.' "5 "Same or
similar" means a "locality of similar geographical location, size and
character in a medical context."5 The decision applies only to
non-board-certified general practitioners, and expands the stan-
dard of medical care from a same or similar community in Mon-
tana to a broader national standard.
Given Montana's rural character, the court adopted the Mary-
land Court of Appeals' "same or similar circumstance" clause to
allow the finder of fact to consider appropriate local factors and
circumstances which may influence the "ordinary standard of
care." '52 Local factors include "the knowledge and experience of the
general practitioner, commensurate with the skill of other compe-
tent physicians of similar training and experience, with respect to
the type of illness he confronts and the resources, facilities and
options available to him at the time."5
46. Id:
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 92-93, 785 P.2d at 210.
51. Id. at 88, 785 P.2d at 207 (quoting Tallbull, 172 Mont. at 335, 564 P.2d at 166).
52. Id. at 92-93, 785 P.2d at 210 (citing Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital
Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975)).
53. Id. at 93, 785 P.2d at 210. Local factors and circumstances include:
(a) the expertise of and means available to the doctor; (b) the health of the pa-
tient; (c) the state of medical knowledge and the standards of care as they existed
at the time of the incident; (d) the availability of medical facilities either directly
or through referral or on a consultation basis; (e) access to communication and
transportation; (f) weather conditions; (g) reasonable medical judgment under the
circumstances, thus allowing for a broad range of therapeutic and diagnostic alter-
natives recognized as legitimate by the profession; (h) with the standards ex-
pressly not imposing liability simply because of a poor result; (i) recognizes explic-
itly that a physicians should not be liable for harm that results from a patient's
[Vol. 53
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The supreme court also decided that a change in Montana law
of this importance should be prospective only.' Because important
judicial decisions of this nature impose a distinct change in the
standards of care for general practitioners, the court decided that
the medical community needed due notice before being held to the
new standard.5
The supreme court declined to adopt Chapel's argument for a
national specialist standard, because the standard requires that
general practitioners, who only have a general medical education
and limited training, be held to the strict standards of a specialist
when treatment falls in a specialist area. 6 The court also rejected
Allison's proposal to retain the "same locality" rule in part because
the rule is "outdated," and also because of a need for increased
availability of expert witnesses.57
IV. COMPETING STANDARDS AND THE SEARCH FOR A REASONABLE
SOLUTION
In Chapel, Justice Sheehy acknowledged that the lower court
had applied the correct rule of law expressed in Talibull, with re-
spect to the standard of care required of a general practitioner in
Montana.5 8 However, the compelling trend to nationalize standards
of medical care led the supreme court to re-examine the medical
standards governing general practitioners in Montana.
The supreme court was presented with dual issues. One,
should "a non-board-certified general practitioner, practicing in a
Montana community, who treats a patient for an injury of a kind
which would ordinarily fall within an area of practice of an ortho-
pedic surgeon be held to the degree of care, knowledge and skill of
the specialist?" 59 Or, two, should the practitioner be "held to that
degree of care, knowledge and skill of a general practitioner prac-
ticing in the same or similar communities in Montana?"6
After reviewing the arguments of both parties and amicus cu-
riae, the court adopted (with slight modification) the position pro-
posed by the MMA.61 The court's position requires that non-
refusal to accept treatment.
Amicus Brief-MMA, supra note 6, at 8-9.
54. Id. at 93, 785 P.2d at 210.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 91-92, 785 P.2d at 209.
57. Id. at 90-92, 785 P.2d at 208-09.
58. Id. at 87, 785 P.2d at 206.
59. Id. at 89, 785 P.2d at 207.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 92, 785 P.2d at 209. See infra notes 62-96 and accompanying text for a
1992]
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board-certified general practitioners be held to "the standard of
care of a 'reasonably competent general practitioner acting in the
same or similar community in the United States in the same or
similar circumstances.' "62 Justice Sheehy's opinion articulates well
the arguments and important policy considerations that underlie
the various issues involved in determining the current medical
standards applied in Chapel.
A. Increased Accountability: The Specialist Standard
On appeal, Chapel challenged the settled rule of law governing
general practitioners in Montana. He favored abrogating the
Tallbull standard and asserted that the national standard of
board-certified orthopedists should be applied to general practi-
tioners "who voluntarily undertake treatment normally performed
by a specialist in the orthopedic branch of medicine. "63
Although this standard proposed a considerable change in the
law, Chapel justified the change by pointing to the increasing trend
toward specialty practice among physicians nationwide. 4 He con-
tended that such a trend obliges the general practitioner to refer
any patient who needs specialized treatment to the appropriate
specialist. 5 Chapel also argued that general practitioners have a
duty to inform their patients of all the alternatives for proper care
and if such physicians lack the expertise or facilities to address the
patients' desired method of treatment, they have a responsibility
to refer patients to a physician who does. 6 Finally, Chapel indi-
cated that in an emergency situation that requires immediate spe-
cialized treatment, the standard should be less stringent than the
requisite national specialty standard. 7 Heeding Montana's rural
character, and the status of general practitioners in Montana, the
court rejected Chapel's argument by concluding that a national
specialist standard exceeded what would be a fair result in the case
at bar, and in future cases. The standard of care Chapel sought to
impose reflects a common position of many plaintiffs in medical
malpractice actions. The plaintiff seeks a higher duty of care to
help establish a breach in the context of a negligence action. As
discussion of MMA's position.
62. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 92-93, 785 P.2d at 210.
63. Additional Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant on the Issue of the Applicable Standard of
Medical Care at 2, Chapel v. Allison, 241 Mont 83, 785 P.2d 204 (1990)(No. 88-550)[herein-
after Brief of Plaintiff-Standards].
64. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 89, 785 P.2d at 208.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 89-90, 785 P.2d at 208.
67. Id. at 90, 785 P.2d at 208.
[Vol. 53
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long as medicine involves highly technical, complicated procedures,
however, unfortunate results will occur absent negligence. The
court needed to create standards that are fair and reasonable for
both doctor and patient.
The supreme court agreed with the MMA's middle-of-the-road
position on the issue, and the court's reasoning reflects the realities
of Montana's specific medical needs. a8 The MMA and the court
rejected the national specialist standard for the following reasons:
(1) The loss of general practice or family practice medical services
in Montana communities, including rural areas; (2) the lack of
specialty care in or near the rural communities, to which to refer
patients; (3) the fact that the general practitioner, though compe-
tent to act in areas which overlap with specialists' areas, is not
necessarily as skilled as the specialist .... 69
The national specialist standard requires that a general practi-
tioner have the same knowledge, skill and training as a national
specialist, so as to perform competently in an overlapping area of
treatment.7" Therefore, general practitioners "qualified to treat an
injury or illness conceivably could be held to the standard of care
of an orthopedic surgeon, dermatologist, neurologist, cardiologist,
internist, obstetrician, gynecologist, etc."7
The nationally uniform standard makes sense for specialists
who hold board-certification, because certification insures that spe-
cialists are properly educated, trained and experienced in their re-
spective specialties." No equivalent national uniformity exists,
however, for general practitioners.73 They typically do not hold
board-certification, have not undergone a three-year residency as a
specialist, and in general have the least training and education of
any group of practitioners in the medical profession.74 The court
found the disparity in education and training and the nature of the
general practitioners' broad-ranging practice made it unrealistic
and unreasonable to expect or require a general practitioner to be
as qualified as a specialist.75
68. Id. at 91, 785 P.2d at 209.
69. Amicus Brief-MMA, supra note 6, at 5.
70. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 92, 785 P.2d at 209.
71. Brief of Respondent on the issue of the Applicable Medical Standard of Care at
16, Chapel v. Allison, 241 Mont. 83, 785 P.2d 204 (1990) (No. 88-550) [hereinafter Brief of
Respondent-Standards].
72. Aasheim, 215 Mont. at 131, 695 P.2d at 827.
73. Brief of Respondent-Standards, supra note 71, at 13.
74. Id. General practitioners receive a "general education with limited experience in
multiple disciplines gained through a one-year rotation." Id. at 13-14.
75. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 92, 785 P.2d at 209.
1992]
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Similarly, if the medical standards are too high, rural general
practitioners tend to leave the profession because they cannot
meet, or fear they will not be able to meet, the higher standards.7 6
The court and the MMA point out that rural communities in Mon-
tana already face a serious shortage of physicians and cannot af-
ford to lose more due to a higher specialty standard of care.77
The MMA and Chapel also recommended that the "national
specialist standard ... be applied to any physician who holds him-
self or herself out as a specialist. 71 8 It appears the supreme court
impliedly rejected this provision in part because of a "lack of spe-
cialty care in and of the rural communities for referral of pa-
tients."7 9 Here the court's reasoning-that a lack of available refer-
ral services provides a good rationale for rejecting the specialist
standard-falls short on several important points. Although spe-
cialty services are limited in rural areas of Montana, today's com-
munication technology and sophisticated medical transportation
(e.g. helicopter service to and from urban hospitals) make it rare
that a rural doctor could not refer a patient for treatment by a
qualified specialist in a nearby area. Expenses and inclement
weather appear to be the only limiting factors and as such could
fall within the emergency exclusion; as Chapel conceded, if rural
doctors must perform an emergency operation and cannot afford
the luxury of referral services, the specialty standard should not
apply."
Referral services may provide a realistic option for today's
practitioners who cannot adequately treat a specialty case. Conse-
quently, practitioners should have a responsibility to refer the
case, or to make clear the risks involved if they nevertheless chose
to treat the patient. If physicians know they cannot competently
treat the patient, and do so anyway, without referral or notice of
the risks, they should be answerable for negligent conduct.
Chapel raised legitimate and persuasive issues and arguments.
The national specialist standard, however, would require a consid-
erable change and a higher duty of care for general practitioners.
The Montana Supreme Court was not ready to adopt changes of
this magnitude.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 91-92, 785 P.2d at 209.
79. Id. at 92, 785 P.2d at 209.
80. Id. at 89-90, 785 P.2d at 208.
[Vol. 53
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B. The Locality Rule: Are the Boundaries Still Necessary?
Allison argued for the continued viability and application of
the "locality"/Tallbull rule as an appropriate standard for a rural
state like Montana. 1 The defense rejected a national specialist
standard because of its impractical effects.8 2 A specialist, orthope-
dic or otherwise, is an apparent minority in a rural Montana com-
munity."' Unlike their urban counterparts, rural communities typi-
cally only receive medical services from a longstanding general
practitioner who has experience with a variety of medical cases. 4
Rural general practitioners have treated a much broader range
of illness and injury than a general practitioner in a large metro-
politan area.8 5 Thus, they hold an advantage over their urban col-
leagues who "devote much of their practice to initial diagnoses
with referral to a specialist for anything beyond routine care."8'
Allison testified that he treated 15 injuries like Chapel's in his ca-
reer, which indicates a level of experience unique to general practi-
tioners in rural areas.8 He advocated the pragmatism of the local-
ity rule as it implicitly accounts for "the need for general
practitioners to treat orthopedic injuries because of the unavaila-
bility of orthopedic surgeons in small towns in Montana."88 Fi-
nally, Allison referred to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 299A comment g (1965), as authority for sustaining the "local-
ity" rule.8 9
The supreme court rejected Allison's arguments and found a
middle ground between the more stringent national specialist stan-
dard, and the regional Tallbull rule. The court's decision does not
81. Id. at 90, 785 P.2d at 208.
82. Id. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text for discussion of Chapel's
argument.
83. Brief of Respondent-Standards, supra note 71, at 12.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 90, 785 P.2d at 208.
87. Id.
88. Brief of Respondent-Standards, supra note 71, at 13.
89. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 90, 785 P.2d at 208. Comment g states:
Allowance must be made also for the type of community in which the actor carries
on his practice. A country doctor cannot be expected to have the equipment, facil-
ities, experience, knowledge or opportunity to obtain it, afforded him by a large
city. The standard is not, however, that of the particular locality. If there are only
three physicians in a small town, and all three are highly incompetent, they can-
not be permitted to set a standard of utter inferiority for a fourth who comes to
town. The standard is rather that of persons engaged in similar practice in similar
localities, considering geographical location, size, and the character of the commu-
nity in general.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 299A comment g (1965).
19921
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substantially change the current standard for general practitioners;
it merely expands the existing locality beyond the boundaries of
Montana, while giving proper deference to important local factors.
By adopting the MMA's position, as modified, the court reached a
fair and reasonable result.
Contemporary medical realities justify eliminating the Mon-
tana boundary restriction, and the sound policy reasons cited in
Tailbull for overturning the "strict locality" rule are equally per-
suasive for revising the "same locality" rule here.90
[T]he accessibility of medical literature, the frequency and availa-
bility of national, regional and state medical meetings, advances
in communication of medical knowledge, transportation advances,
and the opportunity for rural community doctors to gain medical
knowledge in the same manner as doctors in more populous re-
gions in the state, all made the "strict locality rule" outdated. 1
The "same locality" rule no longer serves its historical practi-
cal function. In fact, because of the well-known "conspiracy of si-
lence," the "same locality" limitation had created a major shortage
of available expert witnesses.2 An expanded locality rule will cor-
relatively increase available medical experts, a principal reason for
expanding the locality rule.9 3
The court acknowledged the benefit to the plaintiff of having
increased access to expert witnesses to ensure the injured party's
rights to compensation. The court explained that an abundance of
unqualified expert testimony may also threaten the physician's
right to due process and a fair hearing.94 The supreme court found
that in order to ensure the parties' respective rights, a potential
witness must "possess solid practical experience in the type of
practice at issue" before qualifying as an expert witness. 5
Qualified expert witnesses' testimony provides the jury with
information to determine "whether the physician had and used
such skill, care, and diligence as is ordinarily had and used by the
professional in the same or similar localities and under the same
circumstances. '"96 Because the experts' testimony often carries de-
cisive weight, the court found that the expert's qualifications must
substantiate their experience, which should help to ensure that the
90. Id. at 83, 785 P.2d at 207.
91. Id.
92. Amicus Brief-MMA, supra note 6, at 28.
93. Chapel, 241 Mont. at 92, 785 P.2d at 209.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Nelson v. Sandell, 202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440, 441 (1926).
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testimony given accurately reflects the practices of the specific
medical community at issue. 7
V. AFTER CHAPEL
The supreme court in Chapel took a progressive, but not radi-
cal, step in overturning the "same locality" rule. In effect, the
"same locality" rule was merely expanded to include other locales
in the United States having the same or similar character as the
Montana community where the general practitioner practices. By
considering variables through the "same or similar circumstances"
requirement, the rule in effect remains localized. Likewise, local
considerations ensure that the rural/urban distinctions remain op-
erative. Practically, because the rule provides for the consideration
of Montana's rural character, with the exception of increased avail-
ability of expert witnesses, the standards of care for a general prac-
titioner will not significantly change.
The change in the duty of care standard does not negatively
affect the standards of care for doctors in Montana. However, the
supreme court failed to adequately address several issues which
have a negative impact on the patient. The court left unresolved
the issue involving general practitioners who explicitly hold them-
selves out as specialists. To minimize malpractice, the court should
require that a physician claiming specialty competence hold the
same qualifications as a specialist in the overlapping area of
treatment.
Furthermore, practitioners have no duty to refer a patient who
needs specialty care, or to make known the specific risks of being
treated by a non-specialist. Nor do practitioners have a duty to
perform the specialty treatment as competently as a specialist. The
decision effectively places risks on the patient who chooses special-
ist treatment from a general practitioner.
Nonetheless, certain definitive advantages did arise from the
decision. The supreme court adopted, almost in its entirety, the
MMA's recommendations and in so doing did not alienate the
medical community by imposing unreasonable or unfair standards,
and neither did it immunize them from wrongful conduct. The new
rule created another advantage by increasing available expert testi-
mony. Finally, the "same or similar circumstance" requirement al-
lows judges and juries in medical malpractice suits to consider on a
case-by-case basis whether the doctor violated the duty of care.
This process takes into account Montana's rural nature and result-
97. Amicus Brief-MMA, supra note 6, at 6.
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ing medical needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In deciding Chapel v. Allison, the Montana Supreme Court
provided for the unique problems the medical community in Mon-
tana faces. At the same time, it aligned Montana with a progres-
sive jurisdictional trend to nationalize the standards of care for
general practitioners. By rejecting a national specialist standard,
the court acknowledged the need to maintain a reasonable stan-
dard of care that will ensure that Montana's rural communities re-
tain their general practitioners and thus provide adequate and nec-
essary medical services. The elimination of the Montana boundary
limitation minimally changes the actual standard of care, yet its
expansion provides access to much needed expert testimony. Fi-
nally, the supreme court acted wisely in adopting the MMA's rec-
ommendations as the MMA clearly knows and understands the im-
plications of changing medical standards of care.
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